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I. INTRODUCTION
About half of the states have either passed or attempted to pass laws
aimed at stifling criticism and exposure of factory farms' throughout the
country.2 This unwanted exposure is often the result of undercover reporters
gaining access to the interior of meat-producing entities by seeking and
obtaining employment.' Their reports often expose filthy and dangerous
conditions, substantial animal abuse, and the incorporation of unfit animal
products into the public's food supply.'
It is no wonder the owners of factory farms want to curb the public
outrage that often follows these undercover expos6s. However, the alarming
response from farm corporations is a ubiquitous effort to stifle transparency
regarding the operations going on behind their closed doors.' Why can the
industry not admit that it needs reform? The answer, of course, is money,
and lots of it. Factory farms' low-cost, high-production meat-producing
strategy is highly effective at generating massive profits by externalizing
1. Factory Farms, AM. SOC'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) ("A
factory farm is a large, industrial operation that raises large numbers of animals for food.
Over 99% of farm animals in the U.S. are raised in factory farms, which focus on profit
and efficiency at the expense of animal welfare."); Factory Farm, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/factory%20farm (last visited Mar. 12,
2016) (defining "factory farm" as "a large, industrialized farm, especially a farm on
which large numbers of livestock are raised indoors in conditions intended to maximize
production at minimal cost").
2. What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, AM. Soc'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS, http://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/what-ag-gag-legislation
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016).
3. See Cody Carlson, The Ag Gag Laws: Hiding Factory Farm Abuses from Public




5. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET TAKEOVER
OF AMERICA'S FOOD BUSINESS 4 (2014) ("The first barrier to change is the fact that
everything about Tyson Foods seems hidden .... Tyson seeks obscurity. Examining the
company is all the more difficult because of the apparent code of silence of its employees,
and fear of retaliation on the part of virtually anyone who works with it.").
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costs onto uninformed Americans, vulnerable animals, and the global
ecosystem.6
As state legislatures are thwarted in their attempts to create a statutory
right of privacy for agricultural businesses,' lawmakers' efforts evolve.8
Accordingly, these laws take various forms and are referred to by various
names.9 "Ag-gag" is the catchall nickname that seems to have gained the
most notorietyo because the laws are intended to suppress "dialogue on
issues of considerable public interest."" Hence, the most significant legal
criticism of these laws is that they cannot be reconciled with the First
Amendment.12
As Chief Judge Winmill said recently in the first federal district court
ruling of its kind, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, "food production is
not a private matter."l3 The activists' undercover methods "actually advance
core First Amendment values by exposing misconduct to the public eye." 4
The public has a legitimate interest in knowing what goes on behind the
closed doors of the meat industry." Otter finally gives authority to what
many suspected all along: ag-gag laws violate the First Amendment.'6
6. See Factory Farms, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse:
Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of Ag-Gag Laws, 48 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
337, 359 (2015) (discussing an ag-gag bill that Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam vetoed
as "constitutionally suspect").
8. Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber L. Kingery, Putting a Gag on Farm
Whistleblowers: The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent Confront State
Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 31, 37-38 (2015).
9. Kevin C. Adam, Shooting the Messenger: A Common-Sense Analysis of State
"Ag-Gag" Legislation Under the First Amendment, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1129, 1131
(2012) (explaining that Mark Bittman, of the New York Times, coined the term "ag-gag"
laws).
10. Id.




13. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1208 (D. Idaho 2015),
appealfiled (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015).
14. Id. at 1204.
15. Exposing Abuse on the Factory Farm, supra note 11.
16. See Jessalee Landfried, Bound & Gagged: Potential First Amendment Challenges
to "Ag-Gag" Laws, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 377, 403 (2013) ("There is some
hope that these laws can be challenged under the First Amendment, but in truth, the
constitutional defenses against the bills are not as strong as some opponents suggest-
particularly for the agricultural-fraud bills that are emerging as the most successful
approach.").
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This article analyzes the two competing interests that square off in suits
challenging the legality of ag-gag laws. In one corner of the ring are interest
groups clinging to a First Amendment right to deliver a message often
procured through surreptitious tactics. In the other corner are agricultural
entities, backed by authority of their states, advocating a statutory right to
privacy for the inner workings of their businesses. After Otter, the idea that
the privacy interest of the meat industry must yield to the First Amendment
rights of interested citizens is stronger than ever. However, the Otter opinion
gives minimal attention to the degree to which a corporation or other
artificial entity enjoys a legitimate right to privacy. Certainly, statutorily
derived privacy rights must yield to legitimate First Amendment rights;
however, this article asserts furthermore that any potential privacy claims
asserted by food producers, even those claims that may be constitutionally
derived, must also yield to the First Amendment. Why? Because privacy is
intended to protect natural humans, not artificial entities, and because food
production simply is not a private matter.
In addition to demonstrating that Idaho's ag-gag statute violates the
First Amendment, Otter also demonstrates that any limited right to privacy
claimed by meat-producing companies is necessarily outweighed by the
public's right to know about matters of legitimate public interest.'" These
two concepts, the First Amendment and privacy rights, are important
countervailing considerations because the First Amendment protects not
only the right to speak, but the right to listen, or the right to know, as well.' 8
Indeed, listeners' rights are often considered paramount under the First
Amendment because free speech is designed to allow the public access to
information.'" Although these factory farms may operate on private
property, they implicate so many issues of public concern that no reasonable
expectation of privacy can follow.20 Under the First Amendment, the right
17. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
18. Eric B. Easton, Annotating the News: Mitigating the Effects of Media
Convergence and Consolidation, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 143, 159 (2000)
(discussing precedential cases and explaining that "the notion that a First Amendment
right to know exists independently of the right to speak is supported by more than obiter
dicta").
19. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating "[i]t is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount ...
[and i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here").
20. See, e.g., Beckett v. Serpas, 12-1349, p. 5 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/20/13); 112 So. 3d
348, 352 ("The right to privacy is not absolute; it is qualified by the rights of others, and
it is also limited by society's right to be informed about legitimate subjects of public
interest.").
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to privacy, especially that of an artificial business entity, must end where the
right to know begins.
To examine this idea more closely, this article will explain the interests
at stake in the ag-gag controversy, the development of ag-gag legislation
leading up to Otter, and the Otter holdings as they relate to the public's right
to know. Next, this article will analyze the history and tradition of privacy
rights generally and the extent of those rights for artificial entities to arrive
at this article's thesis: the companies at issue in ag-gag battles, due to their
status as artificial entities, have such an attenuated right to privacy (if any at
all) that their right to privacy regarding matters of legitimate public interest
will practically always be outweighed by the public's First Amendment right
to know.21
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Competing Interests at Stake
1. Privacy Rights for Agricultural Business Entities
Factory farms have become the dominant method of food production
in America.22 The U.S. meat industry is a multi-billion dollar per year
industry, feeding millions of people around the globe.23 In 2014, the U.S.
meat industry, which processes cattle, sheep, pigs, chickens, and turkeys,
sold 186 billion dollars' worth of meat.24 In 2013 alone, the industry
slaughtered 33.2 million cattle, 2.3 million sheep and lambs, 112 million
pigs, 8.6 billion chickens, and 239.4 million turkeys.25 That is nearly 9
billion animals slaughtered in one year, not including the vast numbers of
casualties of the meat processing industry.26 With such huge profits hanging
21. Id.
22. Adam, supra note 9, at 1144; FARM FORWARD, Ending Factory Farming,
https://farmforward.com/ending-factory-farming/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (stating
that USDA data from its 2002 Census of Agriculture estimates that ninety-nine percent
of animals in the United States are raised and slaughtered in factory farms).
23. Sonci Kingery, The Agricultural Iron Curtain: Ag Gag Legislation and the Threat
to Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 645, 646 &
n.6, 680 (2012) (showing that the beef and pork industries alone made a gross income of
over eighty-five billion dollars collectively).
24. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, N. AM. MEAT INST.,
https://www.meatinstitute.org/ht/display/ShowPage/id/47465/pid/47465
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
25. Id.
26. Hatchery Horrors: The Egg Industry's Tiniest Victims, MERCY FOR ANIMALS,
http://hatchery.mercyforanimals.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (explaining that male
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in the balance, factory farm corporations are motivated to get meat to
domestic and international consumers as efficiently and inexpensively as
possible.27
Today, only a handful of giant factory farm companies control meat
production in the United States, all of which are wealthy and politically
powerful.2 8 These companies put cheap meat on tables worldwide and are
interested in keeping their high-production, low-cost strategies away from
public scrutiny for a variety of reasons.29
2. The Right to Know About Matters of Legitimate Public Concern
Broadly speaking, the interest to be considered in a balance against
agricultural entity privacy is the public's right to know about how the food
supply is produced. Specifically, the most salient issues implicated by the
factory farm model include food safety issues, animal abuse, anti-
competitive and poorly regulated behavior, and environmentally toxic and
unsustainable production methods.
a. Human Food Safety Issues
The meat industry poses a significant threat to human health due to the
unsanitary conditions innate to the high-production, low-cost strategy
involved in factory farming and the large quantities of antibiotics used, often
ineffectively, to mitigate the squalid conditions.30 This misuse of antibiotics
leads to antibiotic-resistant super-bacteria, like salmonella and E. coli, which
in turn lead to sicker animals and sicker people." The United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently found that 24% of all cut-up
chicken is contaminated by some form of salmonella, and another study
by Consumer Reports found that more than a third of chicken breasts tainted
with salmonella carry the antibiotic-resistant strain.3 2 When humans are
chicks, for example, are killed because they cannot lay eggs and are "unsuitable" for
meat).
27. Kingery, supra note 23, at 647.
28. LEONARD, supra note 5, at 3-5, 203,229-31 (discussing vertical integration, buyer
power in concentrated markets, antitrust authorities standing idly by during the rise of
the meat oligarchy, and the trend towards meat industries being controlled by only a few
major companies); Modern Meat: Transcript, PBS FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/etc/script.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2016).
29. Modern Meat: Transcript, supra note 28.
30. Adam, supra note 9, at 1149.
31. Id.
32. Wil S. Hylton, A Bug in the System: Why Last Night's Chicken Made You Sick,
THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2015),
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infected with these antibiotic-resistant bacteria, they often cannot be
successfully treated with conventional medication.3 3
The USDA, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have all acknowledged that the
factory farm model will inevitably result in the delivery of antibiotic-
resistant bacteria into home kitchens and restaurants nationwide.34
Importantly, these dangerous bacteria can infect all foods that contact the
bacteria, not just meat, and when food is recalled, as little as 30% of the
recalled item may actually be removed from the reach of consumers." One
example is particularly telling: In early August 2011, Cargill recalled 36
million pounds of turkey meat from a slaughterhouse in Springdale,
Arkansas due to antibiotic-resistant salmonella that sickened more than 100
people and killed another.36 The factory shut down, disinfected, and used a
new antibacterial wash, allegedly subjecting itself to the most aggressive
salmonella monitoring and testing in the nation's poultry industry.37 By mid-
August, the plant was back in full swing, and so was the same strain of
antibiotic-resistant salmonella.
Additionally, the high-production, low-cost strategy of meat
production depends on the use of growth hormones to artificially produce
bigger animals faster.39 Human consumption of these growth hormones has
been linked to various cancers as well as developmental and reproductive
problems.40
Despite these compelling and well-documented threats to public health,
people continue to choose cheap meat. The dollar amounts Americans spend
on average for health care versus groceries has swapped roles since the
1950s: while Americans used to spend 4.5% of their income on health care
and 19% on food, they now spend 18% on health care and only 8% on food.4 1
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/02/02/bug-system.
33. Adam, supra note 9, at 1149n.133.
34. Tom Philpott, For Cargill, It's Tainted Turkey Time Again, MOTHER JONES (Sept.
13, 2011), http://www.mothejones.com/tom-philpott/2011/09/cargill-turkey-recall.
35. Modern Meat: Transcript, supra note 28.
36. Philpott, supra note 34; Jessica White-Cason, Understanding Food Recalls: The
Recall Process Explained, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/08/understanding-food-recalls-the-recall-
process-explained/#.VkuGpd-rTVo (explaining that when food is recalled, it means
companies and government regulators try to get the offending products out of distributor
inventories, off of store shelves, and out of consumer kitchens by collecting the items
and raising public awareness).
37. Philpott, supra note 34.
38. Id.
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Although Patrick Boyle, CEO of the American Meat Institute, chalks this up
as a "great success story" attributable to "squeezing costs out of the
process,"42 the fact that Americans spend less of their income on food than
any other country in the world4 3 is alarming considering the intimate
connection between diet and health. What can Americans do to readjust their
priorities?
Perhaps a lack of transparency in the meat industry is the reason why
Americans continue to buy cheap meat, and more transparency and
education about factory farm practices would lead to reform and a healthier
country.44 Studies indicate that more than half of mothers believe that
providing "all natural" meat products for their families is important even if
doing so more expensive.4 5 Interestingly, people may have decreased
confidence in the integrity of food-labeling methods because words like
"natural" may be used with little regulation.46  Furthermore, the term
"chemical free" may not be used on a meat or poultry label under any
circumstance.7
42. Modern Meat: Interview Patrick Boyle, PBS FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/interviews/boyle.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
43. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, supra note 24.
44. Samantha Morgan, Ag-Gag Challenged: The Likelihood of Success of Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert's First Amendment Claims, 39 VT. L. REv. 241, 270-71
(2014).




46. See Astiana v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 783 F.3d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting
that the FDA has not defined the word "natural"); Krzykwa v. Campbell Soup Co., 946
F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374-75 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (noting that the FDA does not regulate use
of the word "natural"). See also 9 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2016) (offering no definition for the
word "natural"). But see Meat and Poultry Labeling Terms, USDA,
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-
answers/food-safety-fact-sheets/food-labeling/meat-and-poultry-labeling-terms/meat-
and-poultry-labeling-terms (last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (defining "natural" as "a product
containing no artificial ingredient or added color and [that] is only minimally
processed").
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b. Animal Abuse
When over nine billion animals are killed in one year with profit as the
primary goal, humans are not the only ones who bear the externalized costs.48
Instead, animals are the most immediate victims to a game of numbers bent
on minimizing costs to maximize gains.49  Factory farm procedures are
designed to produce animals with the greatest weight in the shortest possible
time,so which often means that animals are confined in crates or enclosures
where they cannot move, and they must remain in their own waste for vast
periods of time.' These animals are often sick or injured; unable to engage
in natural animal behavior; subjected to having their offspring taken from
them repeatedly; and frequently subjected to physical abuse.5 2
The public believes that animal abuse is rare because the meat industry,
which operates behind closed doors, represents instances of affirmative
abuse as isolated events.53 Unfortunately, reports from workers in the
industry and undercover expos6s do not corroborate the industry's
representations of humane animal treatment as the status quo.54 The reality
of what occurs in factory farms is unpleasant and disruptive to the meat-
consuming culture in which most of us were raised." Nonetheless, surveys
suggest hat about half of Americans believe the government should "force
all food companies to indicate the level of animal care on their product
labels," that 73% of Americans would support laws requiring farm animals
to be provided with enough space to act naturally, and that Americans are
48. The United States Meat Industry at a Glance, supra note 24.
49. Adam, supra note 9, at 1144.
50. Id.




53. Morgan, supra note 44, at 245.
54. Kingery, supra note 23, at 677-78 (stating, after interviewing a twenty-year
employee in the meat industry, that "[t]he animals being processed were supposed to be
dead by the time they got to Moreno; far too often, however, they were not.... [I]t was
not uncommon for the animals to survive beyond his station, 'as far as the tail cutter, the
belly ripper, the hide puller.' The Humane Slaughter Act requires livestock be rendered
'insensible' to pain prior to slaughter. Enforcement records, affidavits from workers,
interviews, and videos provide important evidence that this regulation is repeatedly
violated.").
55. DAVID DEGRAZlA, ANIMAL RIGHTS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 2 (2002)
("Most people are opposed to cruelty and sense that animals have moral significance. At
the same time, traditional views that sanction animal use with few constraints have
deeply influenced our beliefs and everyday practices. The moral and intellectual tension
one can experience in the face of such conflicting beliefs motivates an effort to sort out
these issues.").
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willing to pay more for humanely raised meat products.6 These figures
demonstrate that Americans are concerned about the conditions involved in
raising animals for meat, and other legal authorities concur that humane
animal treatment is a matter of public interest."
c. A Self-Regulated Monopolistic Industry That Sets Its Own Standards
Given the huge and powerful self-regulated industry that has become
the dominant means of producing food for Americans," the public's ability
to know about what goes on behind the closed doors of factory farms relies
on whistleblowing and transparency." However, whistleblowers in the
corporate meat industry face serious employment consequences and
apathetic authority figures; abuse is seldom reported because the reporter
risks being fired or demoted, and the report will unlikely result in any action
on behalf of the animals."o Furthermore, the Hazard Analysis Critical
Control Point system required by the USDA to regulate food safety is
primarily implemented by factory farm facilities' own employees.6' The
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspectors review only the
attendant paperwork.62
These government agencies, charged with knowledge and the duty to
regulate, know about the dangers and the violations, but they do little to
rectify the problems.63 Instead, the factory farm giants are cozy with the
agencies, who are supposed to regulate them but disregard accusations of
56. Consumer Perceptions ofFarm Animal Welfare, supra note 45, at 3-7.
57. Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (2012) (implicating humane animal
treatment as a matter of public concern). Many court cases identify issues concerning
humane animal treatment as matters entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g.,
Ouderkirk v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., No. 05-10111, 2007 WL
1035093, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2007) (providing a string cite implicating such
cases). Even the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act provides an exception for "any lawful
economic disruption" caused by "reaction to the disclosure of information about an
animal enterprise." 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2012); Landfried, supra note 16, at 393-94. And,
Justice Alito has characterized humane animal treatment as a compelling interest. U.S.
v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 496 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting).
58. Adam, supra note 9, at 1144 ("Responsible for over ninety-five percent of the
country's chicken, eggs, turkey, and pork and over seventy-five percent of beef cattle,
factory farming has become the dominant means of producing food for the American
consumer.").
59. Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 53.
60. Kingery, supra note 23, at 679.
61. Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 50-51.
62. Id.
63. Philpott, supra note 34.
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food safety violations and animal abuse." Smaller-scale companies that
could likely produce safer food with less pollution, while treating animals
more ethically, cannot compete with the factory farm model with its large
profit margins and government subsidies.5 Indeed, if citizens do not take
matters into their own hands to educate the public, who will?
d. Lack ofSustainability and Vast Environmental Degradation
Factory farming has been implicated as a major contributor to various
types of environmental pollution.6 The Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations has concluded that "[t]he livestock sector emerges as
one of the top two or three most significant contributors to the most serious
environmental problems."16  The vast amounts of waste produced by factory
farms pollute our air and water and contribute to global warming.6 ' Because
the growth of the factory farm industry post-dates many U.S. environmental
laws, the industry often escapes emissions-related laws and regulations.9
In addition, the meat industry is inefficient and unsustainable.0 The
country is able to feed far fewer people because it feeds the grain it produces
to livestock instead of people." Animal agriculture is the leading user of the
country's water resources, a significant fact in light of the water shortages
affecting major parts of the country.72 While grain-fed cattle require 100,000
liters of water per kilogram of food produced, plants like rice, wheat, and
potatoes use an average of about 1,100 liters per kilogram of food
64. Kingery, supra note 23, at 680; see Steve Suppan, The TPP SPS Chapter: Not a
"Model for the Rest of the World," INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.iatp.org/documents/the-tpp-sps-chapter-not-a-%E2%80%9Cmodel-for-the-
rest-of-the-world%E2%80%9D (stating that the U.S. regulatory system and its scientific
underpinnings have been captured by the industries it regulates); see also Philpott, supra
note 34.
65. Adam, supra note 9, at 1147-48; LEONARD, supra note 5, at 265 (discussing large
meat producers' massive profit margins, ability to extinguish open markets and buy up
competitors, and the USDA's multibillion-dollar crop subsidies to Tyson foods since
1996); Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, PEW
COMM'N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD. 1, 2 (2008),
http://www.ncifap.org/ images/PCIFAPFin.pdf.
66. Adam, supra note 9, at 1146.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1146-47.
69. Id.
70. U.S. Could Feed 800 Million People with Grain That Livestock Eat, Cornell
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produced.73 Also, animal agriculture is responsible for an alarming rate of
soil erosion in the United States.74
e. The Factory Farm Model Is Adopted by Developing Nations
The implications of the way factory farms are allowed to conduct
business in the United States is not only significant due to the reasons
discussed above. Other developing nations are adopting these types of
practices to their own detriment and to the detriment of the global
community." As populations increase around the globe, land becomes
scarce, and factory farming becomes attractive, especially if its drawbacks
are not brought to light."7 Often these developing nations are not equipped
to handle the amount of pollution generated by factory farm practices, to
regulate worker safety, or to enforce animal welfare laws, assuming those
laws even exist.n In sum, the adoption of the factory farm model by
developing nations around the globe magnifies all of the above-mentioned
concerns emanating from the factory farm method. .
B. Ag-Gag Sweeps the Nation
In an attempt to educate the public about these serious problems,
various interest groups initiated efforts to record business practices inside
factory farms." In 2008, the Humane Society released an undercover video
capturing six weeks' worth of evidence from the Hallmark Meat Packing
Company in Chino, California.79 The video showed workers resorting to
abusive tactics in order to get downed cattle (non-ambulatory cattle or cattle
that are too sick to stand or walk) to slaughter.0 The video resulted in the
recall of 143 million pounds of beef, the largest in U.S. history," because
downed cattle are banned from the food supply.82 The company did not
recover from the episode and eventually filed for bankruptcy.3 Two
employees faced criminal charges for the abusive events.84 This video
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America, supra
note 65, at 9.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Shea, supra note 7, at 337-38.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Adam, supra note 9, at 1152; Shea, supra note 7, at 338.
82. 21 C.F.R. § 189.5 (2015).
83. Shea, supra note 7, at 338.
84. Adam, supra note 9, at 1152.
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represents only one of countless others produced in a surge of efforts by
citizens and interest groups to inform the public about factory farm practices;
these films have understandably damaged the reputation of the meat industry
and sparked retaliatory legislation by the powerful meat lobby.85
Ag-gag legislation, which first emerged in the 1990s,6 has recently re-
emerged as a contentious topic in the law and in the media. Since 2011,
about half of America's state legislatures have attempted to pass at least one
ag-gag law, and these laws have had varying degrees of success." These
statutes criminalize whistleblowing and are aimed at giving special
protection to the privacy interests of large-scale meat-producing companies
to the detriment of the public's right to know about the industry's practices.88
Thus far, the majority of ag-gag legislation can be said to criminalize
one or more of four main categories of behavior: (1) recording,
photographing, videotaping, or audio-recording at agricultural facilities; (2)
possession or distribution of recordings; (3) dishonesty while applying for
employment to gain access to a facility; and (4) failure to report recorded
abuse or relinquish recordings within a very short time frame, also known as
mandatory disclosure."
Each of these implicates First Amendment rights.o Category One
targets protected speech critical of animal agricultural practices.9' The
argument that the law does not restrict speech but merely restricts conduct is
unavailing because the recordings are communicative, and there is an
audience to receive the communication.92 Category Two implicates First
85. Id. at 1151-55; Kingery, supra note 23, at 680.
86. Kansas produced the first ag-gag bill in 1990, followed by Montana and North
Dakota in 1991. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-101
(2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-21.1-02 (2015). All of these laws currently remain
valid.
87. Ag-Gag Legislation by State, AM. Soc'Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO
ANIMALS,
http://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/ag-gag-legislation-state
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (noting that twenty-six states in all have either passed or tried
to pass ag-gag laws since 1990).
88. Paige M. Tomaselli, You Have a Constitutional Right to Record and Report
illegal Activity at Factory Farms, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY (Aug. 6, 2015),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/blog/4002/you-have-a-constitutional-right-to-
record-and-report-illegal-activity-at-factory-farms.
89. Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 37.
90. See infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
91. Adam, supra note 9, at 1169-70.
92. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (stating that the test for
expressive conduct requires that "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
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Amendment rights for the same reason-it chills protected speech critical of
animal agricultural practices.93
Category Three developed as an attempt to circumvent First
Amendment challenges by avoiding reference to any type of recording and
simply criminalizing dishonesty in applying for an agricultural job for the
purpose of undercover reporting.94 Some newer, stronger versions of this
category have evolved that make "employment fraud" in any context illegal,
which might minimize the risk the law will fail for restricting the content of
speech.95 Although fraudulent speech is typically an unprotected category
of speech, the Supreme Court clarified in United States v. Alvarez that the
government may criminalize only false statements that directly cause a
legally cognizable harm.96 In the context of ag-gag cases, Otter, citing
Alvarez, demonstrates that the alleged harm claimed by these farm entities
results from publication of true stories that the public finds unacceptable, not
from any deception to gain employment and access.97
Similarly, Category Four is subject to First Amendment challenge.
Mandatory disclosure laws are ag-gag laws disguised as proactive measures
to mitigate animal abuse.98 By attaching criminal sanctions to people who
document animal abuse but do not report it to authorities within a very short
time frame, the laws chill speech and prevent reporters from compiling
comprehensive evidence and patterns of abuse." The First Amendment,
however, protects not only the right to affirmatively speak, but also the right
to refrain from speaking.'0 These rights "are complementary components
of the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind." ' 1o
would be understood by those who viewed it"). See also Adam, supra note 9, at 1137;
Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 37.
93. Landfried, supra note 16, at 397-98.
94. Id. at 396.
95. Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 46.
96. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012).
97. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1204 (D. Idaho 2015),
appeal filed (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) ("Instead, the most likely harm that would stem
from an undercover investigator using deception to gain access to an agricultural facility
would arise, say, from the publication of a story about the facility, and not the
misrepresentations made to gain access to the facility."). The opinion went on to discount
the argument that misrepresentations made in the context of ag-gag cases are motivated
by material personal gain, which would render them unprotected as fraudulent. Id.
98. Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 69.
99. See id. at 37.
100. See id. at 70.
101. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
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III. ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. OTTER
Of all the ag-gag bills in various forms and various stages of the law-
making process, four statutes have been the subject of complaints filed in
federal court, but only one has proceeded to trial on the merits:102 Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Otter was litigated in federal court in Idaho and has
been appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.o3 The Otter plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of Idaho's ag-gag statute as a violation of the
Freedom of Speech and Equal Protection Clauses and argued that the Idaho
statute was preempted by federal law." The Idaho statute implicates the
types of speech in Categories One and Three by creating criminal penalties
for "interference with agricultural production" when a person knowingly:
(a) Is not employed by an agricultural production facility
and enters an agricultural production facility by force,
threat, misrepresentation or trespass; (b) Obtains records of
an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass; (c) Obtains employment with
102. The first challenge, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Herbert, was filed in federal
court in Utah, and the case is still pending. See Complaint at 1, Animal Legal Def. Fund
v. Herbert, No. 2:13CV00679, 2013 WL 4017889 (D. Utah Jul. 22, 2013) (challenging
constitutionality of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 under the First Amendment as both
content-based and overbroad). Like Idaho's ag-gag law, Utah's law implicates the types
of speech in Categories One and Three. See Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 39. The
last action taken in this Utah suit, according to the docket, was an Order Granting
Unopposed Extension of Time to File Dispositive Motions filed on March 10, 2016
giving the parties until May 30, 2016 to file dispositive motions. Idaho's Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter was the second complaint filed on March 17, 2014. See Complaint
at 50, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2014 WL
1017045 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2014). Next came a complaint filed in federal court in
Wyoming in September of 2015. See Complaint at 1, 69, Western Watersheds Project et
al. v. Michael et al., No. 2:15-CV-00169-SWS (D. Wyo. Sept. 29, 2015) (challenging
the constitutionality of WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-414 and § 40-26-101 under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments). The fourth and most recent complaint was filed in North
Carolina in January of 2016. See Complaint at 1-2, 55, People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals et al. v. Cooper et al., No. 1:16-CV-00025 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 13, 2016)
(challenging constitutionality of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 under the the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
103. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943
(D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015); Notice of Appeal at 1-4, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden,
No. 1:14-CV-00104-BLW.
104. Id. at 1199. The plaintiffs claimed that the ag-gag law was preempted by three
different federal statutes: the False Claims Act, the Food Safety Modernization Act, and
the Clean Water Act. See Complaint at 46-48, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, No. 14-
00104, 2014 WL 1017045 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2014). The court, however, did not rule on
these points.
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an agricultural production facility by force, threat, or
misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other
injury to the facility's operations ... ; (d) Enters an
agricultural production facility that is not open to the public
and, without the facility owner's express consent or
pursuant to judicial process or statutory authorization,
makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility's operations; or (e)
intentionally causes physical damage or injury to the
agricultural production facility's operations, livestock,
crops, personnel, equipment, buildings or premises.'os
On August 3, 2015, Chief Judge Winmill of the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho ruled that the ag-gag statute's audiovisual
recording prohibition was a content-based and viewpoint-based speech
restriction, which warranted strict scrutiny; that he government's interest in
protecting the privacy of Idaho's agricultural production facilities was not
compelling; that the ag-gag statute was not narrowly tailored to serve such
an interest; and that the ag-gag statute did not even withstand rational basis
analysis under an Equal Protection analysis."' Whether discussing privacy
or the First Amendment, the public's right to know is a theme that rings true
throughout the opinion.'0 7
A. Otter's First Amendment Analysis
First, the court set out to establish that the activity burdened by the
Idaho law constitutes speech.'0o The court quickly dispensed with the State's
argument that the law burdened bare conduct and not speech.' In doing so,
the court implicitly found that there was a message to be communicated by
105. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(a)-(e) (2015), declared unconstitutional by
Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1211-12.
106. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207-08. Although a final order has not been issued at
the time of this article's writing because of arguments relating to an appropriate remedy,
the substance and reasoning of the non-final order have been designated for publication
by the issuing court and will unlikely change unless appealed. Because the time for filing
a notice of appeal is measured from the date a final order is issued, the State of Idaho has
ample time to request an appeal and will likely do so. Although the parties have allegedly
agreed that the preemption arguments are rendered moot by the substance of the
interlocutory order, the preemption issues could still be brought up on appeal. Telephone
interview with Julie Varin, Law Clerk for Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill, U.S. Dist. Court
for the Dist. of Idaho (Oct. 14, 2015).
107. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1201, 1207-08.
108. Id. at 1202-03.
109. Id. at 1202.
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the burdened activity and an audience to receive the communication. "o The
court reasoned that just as writing, painting, and playing an instrument are
purely expressive activities, so is audiovisual recording."'
Next, the court explained why the "misrepresentations" (or false
speech) targeted by the law constitute protected speech.112 Under United
States v. Alvarez, the government may criminalize false statements only
when the statements themselves cause legally cognizable harm.'13 The court
asserted that the defendant could not establish material or legally cognizable
harm solely by misrepresenting or omitting a journalistic or political
affiliation.l 14 Instead, any harm that would likely arise from an undercover
investigation would result directly from the public's reaction to the content
of a published story."' Furthermore, when an undercover employee is paid
for the work performed, reasonable reliance on a material misrepresentation
is absent.'1 6
The bottom line is that the publication of a true story is not the type of
direct material harm proscribed by Alvarez because the undercover reporters
did not obtain any material advantage by making the misrepresentations."7
Conversely, "the lies used to facilitate undercover investigations actually
advance core First Amendment values by exposing misconduct to the public
eye and facilitating dialogue on issues of considerable public interest. This
type of politically salient speech is precisely the type of speech the First
Amendment was designed to protect.""
The court correctly reasoned that the Idaho statute was content-based
because it targeted only speech related to the operations of an agricultural
production facility, and because the evidence demonstrated that the statute's
underlying purpose was to silence animal activists."' Although a statute
110. See id. at 1205; see also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974).
111. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1205.
112. Id. at 1203-04.
113. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act, as applied to a
man who pleaded guilty to misrepresenting that he had won a Congressional Medal of
Honor, violated the First Amendment as a content-based restriction).
114. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1203-04.
115. Id. at 1204; accord Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522
(4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the publication damages claimed by Food Lion resulted
directly from diminished consumer confidence in the store and that it was Food Lion's
food handling practices, not the publication of them, which caused the loss of consumer
confidence).
116. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 514.
117. See Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1204.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1205. The court identified evidence that demonstrated a purpose to silence
animal activists in the statute's legislative history and in its disproportionate criminal
sanctions. Id. at 1205-07. The law authorized a sentence of imprisonment for up to one
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meeting either one of these standards would amount to a content-based
restriction, the court held that the Idaho law satisfied both.120 The court
rejected the State's argument that the law did not regulate what was said but
only where it was said, reasoning that a person could not violate the law
simply by standing in an agricultural production facility.121
Thus concluding that strict scrutiny applies, the court proceeded to
reject the State's argument that the law was narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling state interest.122 Although the court acknowledged that the
"State's interest in protecting personal privacy and private property is
certainly an important interest,"l2 3 the court was not convinced that the
asserted interests were compelling.124 Property and privacy interests do not
supersede all other interests, and "food production is not a private matter"
because the safety of the food supply, worker safety, and the humane
treatment of animals are all matters of legitimate public interest.125
Even assuming the State's interests were compelling, the court noted
that the law was not narrowly drawn, primarily because Idaho's other laws
prohibiting fraud, theft, trespass, and defamation adequately protect those
interests without burdening free speech.126 The court found it particularly
alarming that even legitimate employees who were engaged in
whistleblowing could fall within the statute's reach.127 Although the State
insisted that the law was narrowly tailored because it applied only to speech
in a private forum, the court simply reiterated its theme that the public had a
First Amendment right to know: "[A]nimal agriculture is a heavily-regulated
[sic] industry and food production and safety are matters of the utmost public
concern."28 "The remedy for misleading speech, or speech we do not like,
is more speech, not enforced silence." 29 "Society has the right and civic
duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational discourse," and "[t]hese ends are
year; a $5,000 fine; and restitution twice the amount of damages resulting from the
violation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (3)-(4) (2015), declared unconstitutional by
Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1211-12.
120. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1205-07.
121. Id. at 1205.
122. Id. at 1207.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1207-08 (D. Idaho 2015),
appealfiled (9th Cir. Dec. 14,2015).
126. Id. at 1208.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
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not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate public discussion
through content-based mandates."3 o
B. Otter's Equal Protection Analysis
While the court's First Amendment analysis acknowledged that the
State's interest in "protecting personal privacy and private property is
certainly an important interest," the court's Equal Protection analysis applied
rational basis scrutiny.13' Even more interestingly, the Idaho statute did not
survive rational basis scrutiny because "a bare congressional desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest," and because "[p]rotecting the private interests of a powerful
industry, which produces the public's food supply, against public scrutiny is
not a legitimate government interest."'32 As with the content-based speech
analysis, the court found the Idaho statute to satisfy both standards for
discriminating between classes: it discriminated facially, and its purpose was
to discriminate.'33
Generally under the law, "important" or legitimate interests should
withstand rational basis scrutiny,'34 but Otter's rational basis analysis had
teeth, similar to landmark cases like City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,135 or Romer v. Evans'36 in which a court demonstrated a
willingness to strike a statute that burdened a particular group for illegitimate
reasons.'37 Otter seems to be applying rational basis "with bite" to a statute
that targets whistleblowers in the food production context because protecting
the privacy of meat-producing entities is an illegitimate statutory goal when
it conflicts with the public's right to know about activities concerning food
production.3 8
130. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1209.
131. Id. at 1207-09.
132. Id. at 1210 ("Many legislators made their intent crystal clear by comparing animal
rights activists to terrorists, persecutors, vigilantes, blackmailers, and invading
marauders who swarm into foreign territory and destroy crops to starve foes into
submission."). Furthermore, the existence of laws to protect citizens against fraud, theft,
trespass, and defamation demonstrated that the law lacked a rational relationship to the
asserted interests. Id. at 1202.
133. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1210.
134. See Alex M. Hagen, Mixed Motives Speak in Diferent Tongues: Doctrine,
Discourse, and Judicial Function in Class-of-One Equal Protection Theory, 58 S.D. L.
REV. 197, 210 (2013) ("Generally, state action subject to rational basis review will
survive, and state action subject to heightened scrutiny will be invalidated.").
135. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
136. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
137. Hagen, supra note 134, at 217.
138. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207.
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Amicus Erwin Chemerinsky submitted an alternative Equal Protection
argument to which the court gave additional attention.'39 Chemerinsky
argued that the Idaho statute unjustifiably discriminated on the basis of a
fundamental right-free speech-thus, strict scrutiny should apply to the
Equal Protection argument too.140 The court's decision to strike the statute
under rational basis when it could have simply maintained its application of
strict scrutiny is remarkable: the court sent a clear message that statutes
created to protect the privacy of meat-producing entities against the public's
right to know cannot survive any degree of constitutional scrutiny.14 '
Although bold, the court's decision was correct because the public's right to
know in the context of factory farm food production is very strong, and the
meat industry's right keep its business activities private is very weak.
Courts and legal scholars seem to agree that ag-gag laws do not pass
constitutional muster.14 2 The privacy interest of these giant meat-producing
139. Id. at 1211.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1207.
142. See, e.g., Adam, supra note 9, at 1174 ("As such, most 'ag-gag' laws will be either
ineffective or unconstitutional; they will provide minimal punishment and permit
distribution, or they will be deemed unconstitutional prior restraints on free speech.");
Kingery, supra note 23, at 668 ("Under these elements of First Amendment analysis, the
provisions of Ag Gag bills that would make undercover videotaping and photography
illegal do not appear to be constitutional."); Landfried, supra note 16, at 389
("Additionally, neither type of bill serves a compelling government purpose. Indeed,
these bills more likely restrict a compelling government interest in public access to
information relating to food safety and animal cruelty. These ag-gag laws therefore are
unlikely to survive a strict-scrutiny test and would be held unconstitutional."); Larissa
U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How United
States v. Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL.
L. REv. 566, 573 (2014) ("The [ag-gag] laws can be understood to be 'specifically
targeting people engaged in First Amendment activities,' and a court may therefore use
a heightened level of scrutiny, perhaps even strict scrutiny."); Morgan, supra note 44, at
273 ("Whether or not the plaintiffs in ALDF v. Herbert are ultimately successful, there
are numerous reasons why courts should protect animal activists' right to film in factory
farms. Whistleblowers are vital to animal protection groups because no laws currently
exist that specifically protect farm animals, and factory farm workers are unlikely to
report abuse."); Reid & Kingery, supra note 8, at 68 ("Ag-gag criminal prosecutions
seem to present exactly the grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech
that even the Alvarez dissenters acknowledged is protected under the First
Amendment."); Shea, supra note 7, at 370-71 ("And, depending on the outcome of
lawsuits challenging ag-gag statutes filed in Utah and Idaho, rapid reporting statutes
might soon be considered the only constitutionally valid form of ag-gag."); Daniel L.
Sternberg, Why Can't I Know How the Sausage Is Made?: How Ag-Gag Statutes
Threaten Animal Welfare Groups and the First Amendment, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y
& ETHICS J. 625, 656-57 (2015) ("Ag-Gag statutes, by making slaughterhouses
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corporations (assuming arguendo any privacy interest exists at all) is simply
too weak to overcome the public's right to know. The analyses of Otter
undertaken so far focuses on the First Amendment or Equal Protection as
being sufficient to strike ag-gag laws. But what about the countervailing
right asserted by the State? The privacy of agricultural business entities is
really the only interest alleged in defense of the ag-gag statute in Otter.14 3
Otter said, "The State's interest in protecting personal privacy ... is
certainly an important interest."" But, the court also said, "Protecting the
private interests of a powerful industry, which produces the public's food
supply, against public scrutiny is not a legitimate government interest. "145
Otter shows that somewhere between personal privacy rights and the privacy
rights of a powerful industry, the strength of the privacy interest breaks
down.146 So, to what degree are artificial entities "persons" who can assert
legitimate claims to privacy rights?
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY: A PURELY PERSONAL
GUARANTEE THAT GENUFLECTS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Although privacy is an expansive right in many ways, it is also an
exceedingly nebulous right; its coverage is like a patchwork quilt-the
patches are taken from a plethora of sources; some patches offer rich and
adequate protection from offending elements; and some patches are
threadbare and weak. This article addresses privacy rights of artificial
entities generally and factory farms specifically to determine whether factory
farms, which are situated on private property, have any substantial right to
privacy. By history and tradition, business entities are not considered
"persons" who can assert any practical right of privacy.147
The amalgam of rights that comprise privacy comes from
constitutional, common, and statutory law;14 1 it has roots in both civil and
impenetrable, threaten animal welfare groups and the First Amendment alike. However,
there is a First Amendment right o know how the sausage is made.").
143. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1202 ("The State responds that § 18-7042 is not
designed to suppress speech critical of certain agricultural operations but instead is
intended to protect private property and the privacy of agricultural facility owners.").
144. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 1210 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill ofRights,
41 HASTINGS L. J. 577, 579-80 (1990).
148. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 10 (5th
ed. 2015).
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criminal law;'49 and it protects against both private and public infringers.'
Privacy is often thought to protect one of two broad categories: informational
or decisional privacy.' ' Yet these two categories often converge and can be
difficult to distinguish.'52 Ultimately, regardless of its source and regardless
of its scope, the privacy right has developed as a protection of values
fundamentally human in nature.' Privacy, most fundamentally, protects
human dignity.'54 Human dignity is an abstract yet indispensable value, and
149. In the Fourth Amendment context, businesses are entitled to a degree of Fourth
Amendment privacy protection, but criminal law tenets broadly accept that with respect
to private property used for commercial purposes, owners have a lesser expectation of
privacy than they do for noncommercial residences, and, similarly, corporations have a
lesser expectation of privacy than individuals. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90
(1998) ("Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth
Amendment purposes from residential property. 'An expectation of privacy in
commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a similar
expectation in an individual's home."') (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700
(1987)); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986) (stating that
"the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such
property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's home").
Furthermore, the Court has recognized that "a business, by its special nature and
voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions that would not be permissible in a
purely private context." G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977).
150. SOLOVE& SCHWARTZ, supra note 148, at 34.
151. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) ("The cases sometimes
characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in fact involved at least two different kinds of
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.");
Doe v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 835 F. Supp. 2d 762, 768 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
152. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600 ("Thus, the statute threatens to impair both their
interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making
important decisions independently.");
see generally SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 148 (treating everything within the
textbook as informational privacy, including cases that relate to the issue of decisional
privacy, such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which recognizes that the constitutional
right to privacy protects personal autonomy); Colegio Puertorriqueno De Ninas,_Liceo
Ponceno, Inc. v. Pesquera De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761, 765-66 (D.P.R. 1979)
(discussing "informational probes by the government" in the context of Griswold's
constitutional penumbras). To use an imperfect heuristic rule, tort privacy law primarily
protects informational privacy, while constitutional privacy law (other than the Fourth
Amendment) primarily protects decisional privacy.
153. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 214 (1890).
154. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (recognizing that the constitutional right to privacy protects "choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)
(stating that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State"). Although the seminal
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accordingly, privacy is an abstract yet indispensable component of the
law. 5 5
A. Warren and Brandeis: The Right to Informational Privacy
1. Privacy Was Intended for Natural Persons, Not Artificial Entities
When Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote "The Right to
Privacy" in 1890 for the Harvard Law Review, they did so because they
thought it necessary to "define anew the exact nature and extent of such
protection" and because "[p]olitical, social, and economic changes entail the
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows
to meet the demands of society.""
Countless scholars trace privacy rights to the Harvard article.' Tort
remedies developed from the article, and the article's language suggests that
the type of privacy it contemplates is complementary to that afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.' The article's influence in tort law and criminal law
demonstrates that these dynamic rights originate from an ultimately
common, yet dynamic source. The seminal article makes apparent that
Warren and Brandeis were concerned about the informational privacy"9 of
individual human beings'60 and the "dignity . . . of the individual": '
The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the
heightening of sensations which came with the advance of
civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain,
pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts,
emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition, and
Warren and Brandeis article discusses the privacy of "information," it also discusses the
"dignity . .. of the individual." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153.
155. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153.
156. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 193.
157. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 148, at 11.
158. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 220 ("The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own officers
engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance
to constituted authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?").
159. See generally id. (referring throughout to the privacy of "information" four times).
160. Roberts, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12.
161. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153 ("To determine in advance of experience the
exact line at which the dignity and convenience of the individual must yield to the
demands of the public welfare or of private justice would be a difficult task; but the more
general rules are furnished by the legal analogies already developed in the law of slander
and libel, and in the law of literary and artistic property.") (emphasis added).
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the beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the
common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite
protection, without the interposition of the legislature.162
The article uses the word "individual" twenty-eight times and
"feelings" seventeen times.'63 It discusses "intrusion upon the domestic
circle" and uses the word "domestic" seven times throughout he article to
explain the scope of individual privacy rights." It discusses protectable
interests in "thoughts, emotions, and sensations" and injuries such as "mental
pain and distress" and "mental suffering."'6 ' These types of injuries only
make sense in the context of a human being and certainly not in the context
of a corporation or other artificial entity.'66
The defendants in Herbert and Otter appear to assert a privacy right
springing forth from the fact that their businesses are situated on private
property. 67 Warren and Brandeis, however, stated several times that "the
principle which has been applied to protect these rights is in reality not the
principle of private property, unless that word be used in an extended and
unusual sense."68
162. Id. at 195.
163. Id. at 193-220.
164. Id. at 195-214. Domestic means "of, relating to, or involving the family or the
household." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 591 (10th ed. 2014).
165. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 196, 206, 213.
166. N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 730-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
("While a corporation may have its reputation or business damaged as a result of
intrusive activity, it is not capable of emotional suffering."); see Barket v. Clarke, No.
2:12-CV-393 JCM (GWF), 2012 WL 2499359, at *5 (D. Nev. June 26, 2012) (alluding
to the idea that privacy torts protect feelings, not reputational harm, in observing that the
"false light action differs from a defamation action in that the injury in privacy actions is
mental distress from having been exposed to public view, while the injury in defamation
actions is damage to reputation"); accord Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589,
594 (Ind. 2001) (noting that other jurisdictions have unanimously denied a right of
privacy to corporations).
167. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1202 (D. Idaho 2015),
appeal filed (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) ("All of these facts suggest that § 18-7042 was
designed to suppress speech critical of the agricultural industry, and not protect private
property as the State claims."); Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Its
Motion to Dismiss at 13-14, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-00679-RJS
(D. Utah Jan. 9, 2014).
168. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 213.
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2. Privacy Was Not Intended to Protect Matters of Legitimate Public
Concern
The article robustly supports the idea that privacy rights must end
where the public interest creates a need for information: "The design of the
law must be to protect those persons with whose affairs the community has
no legitimate concern."1 Of the six general rules the article posits relating
to privacy, the very first provides that "[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest."7 o
In general, then, the matters of which the publication
should be repressed may be described as those which
concern the private life, habits, acts, and relations of an
individual, and have no legitimate connection with his
fitness for a public office which he seeks or for which he is
suggested, or for any public or quasi public position which
he seeks or for which he is suggested, and have no legitimate
relation to or bearing upon any act done by him in a public
or quasi public capacity.. . . Some things all men alike are
entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public
life or not, while others are only private because the persons
concerned have not assumed a position which makes their
doings legitimate matters of public investigation."'
Within this same section discussing the competing interests of privacy
and matters of legitimate public concern, Warren and Brandeis discuss a
need for flexibility in this area of the law and acknowledge the difficulties in
applying a standard that escapes definition.'7 2
"Any rule of liability adopted must have in it an
elasticity which shall take account of the varying
circumstances of each case, - a necessity which
unfortunately renders such a doctrine not only more difficult
of application, but also to a certain extent uncertain in its
operation and easily rendered abortive."'73
169. Id. at 214. The next sentence in the articles goes on to classify as "proper" the
preference to keep private such affairs with which the community has no legitimate
concern. Id. at 214-15.
170. Id. at 214.
171. Id. at 216.
172. Id.
173. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 215-16.
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In other words, privacy protections are necessarily abstract and should
not attach in all contexts.
The article concludes by explaining the need for a more robust right to
privacy "of the individual" against those who would otherwise pry,
appealing to a legal notion familiar to all: "The common law has always
recognized a man's house as his castle, impregnable, often, even to its own
officers engaged in the execution of its commands. Shall the courts thus
close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the back door
to idle or prurient curiosity?"'74 Again, this language demonstrates that civil
and criminal privacy rights ultimately spring from a common source, and
human "dignity" and "feelings" are the relevant interests worthy of
protection "against the world."'
Today, the four common law privacy rights generally recognized by
civil tort law include intrusion upon seclusion, false light, public disclosure,
and appropriation.16 Notably, the law still reflects both of Warren and
Brandeis's ideas: privacy rights developed to protect natural individuals, not
artificial entities, 1I and the public's right to know can override the privacy
interests of a natural individual."' As a distinct matter, modem law also
shows that extending these four privacy rights to corporations is unpopular,
if not unprecedented."'
3. Modem Privacy Rights Still Bend a Knee to the First Amendment
The facts of Ouderkirk v. People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals,
Inc. are somewhat representative of the privacy issues related to ag-gag
laws.' The decision demonstrates that claims asserting violations of
174. Id. at 220.
175. Id. at 213.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-E (1977).
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 (1977) (stating that "[e]xcept for
the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be
maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded"). Comment C
elaborates that a "corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal
right of privacy ... [and] therefore no cause of action for any of the four forms of
invasion covered by §§ 652B to 652E." Id.
178. See discussion infra Section IV.A.3.
179. Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 594 (Ind. 2001) (noting that the
Restatements, without exception, deny a cause of action to corporations, partnerships,
and unincorporated associations for any of the four forms of privacy invasion and also
noting that other jurisdictions have unanimously denied the protection of privacy rights
to corporations).
180. See Ouderkirk v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., No. 05-10111,
2007 WL 1035093, at * 19 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2007) (holding that the "methods and
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privacy tort law, even on behalf of natural persons, must yield when the
information at issue is a matter of legitimate public concern.'"' In Ouderkirk,
two undercover reporters gained access to a couple's chinchilla ranch in
Michigan by misrepresenting themselves as interested potential buyers of the
ranch.'82 The ranch owners granted permission for the undercover duo to
record footage of the ranch operations that included Mr. Ouderkirk killing
chinchillas via electrocution and cervical dislocation."' Eventually, PETA
published an informative article about the Ouderkirks' chinchilla ranch on
its website, complete with video clips.'84 The video clips contained graphic
and controversial information, cast the Ouderkirks in a negative light, and
resulted in public outrage.'5 The Ouderkirks sued PETA in tort for intrusion
upon seclusion, misappropriation, false light, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.186
The Ouderkirks' intrusion claim was unsuccessful because they could
not meet their burden of showing that the subject matter of the disclosure
was private, and because they had granted permission for the undercover
reporters to film.' According to the court, a privacy right is waived when
a defendant publicizes the activities of a business that deals with the
public.' Furthermore, the court, interpreting Michigan law, noted that
consent precludes an intrusion claim, even if the consent was obtained by
misrepresentation or fraud, and even when the defendants exceeded the
scope of the permission granted.'"9
practices of raising and destroying animals, especially for commercial purposes, has been
recognized as a matter of public concern").
181. See generally id.
182. Id.at*L.
183. Id. at *5.
184. Id. at *6.
185. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *6-7, *10.
186. Id. at * 1. The Ouderkirks did not, for some reason, bring a privacy claim asserting
publicity given to private facts, although that claim would presumptively fail as well for
the same reason as the other three-the information disclosed was not private. The claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is beyond the scope of this article, but the
court held that the claim was unsuccessful because the defendants' conduct was not "so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Id. at *24.
187. Id. at *13-14, *17 (stating that the elements of the Michigan intrusion claim
include: "(1) an intrusion by the defendant, (2) into a matter that the plaintiff has a right
to keep private, (3) by the use of a method that is objectionable to the reasonable
person").
188. Id. at *14 (noting that the Ouderkirks were active in industry associations, they
conducted seminars open to the public for a small fee on their methods and practices,
and many of their customers posted information about their ranch online).
189. Id. at*15.
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In bolstering the idea that fraud does not vitiate consent to an intrusion,
the court went on to discuss the distinction between privacy rights based on
property interests and those based on one's "inviolate personality,"'9 0 similar
to the theme of the Warren and Brandeis article.'91 Because no
"embarrassingly intimate details" of the Ouderkirks' lives were publicized,
their privacy claim based on intrusion failed.'92
The Ouderkirks' misappropriation claim also failed because the court
held that the defendants' publication concerned matters of legitimate public
concern.19' The court upheld the notion that the First Amendment bars
appropriation liability when the disclosed information is newsworthy, as
long as the plaintiffs name or likeness was not used primarily for
commercial gain.'94 The court reasoned that disclosure is necessary for "the
maintenance of an informed public."' Deciding what is in the sphere of the
public interest is an issue for the court as a matter of law, and the opinion
suggests that courts will give the public interest exception a wide berth.'19 6
The court did not hesitate to include commercial practices that involve
raising and destroying animals as being well within the realm of public
interest.197
In finding that PETA's disclosures were matters of legitimate public
interest, the court cited the Animal Welfare Act and multiple court cases
recognizing the public's interest in humane animal treatment.'98 The court
190. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *15-16.
191. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 205 ("The principle which protects
personal writings and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical
appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private
property, but that of an inviolate personality.").
192. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *17.
193. Id. at * 18 (stating that the tort of misappropriation is committed whenever "the
defendant makes use of the plaintiff's name or likeness for his own purposes and
benefit," that "in contrast to the other forms of invasion of privacy, there need be no
allegation that a statement about a plaintiff was an intrusion upon seclusion or private
matters or that it was in any way false, and that "any unauthorized use of a plaintiff's
name or likeness, however inoffensive in itself, is actionable if that use results in a benefit
to another") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977)).
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. for Pub. Pol'y, 680 N.W.2d 915, 919
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).
196. See id. at * 18, *20 (stating that "no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the
'defendant's use of plaintiff s likeness was for a predominantly commercial purpose' or
that PETA's publication was entirely 'without a redeeming public interest, news, or
historical value"') (emphasis added).
197. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *19.
198. Id. (providing a string cite of five cases implicating humane animal treatment as
a subject of general public concern). The Animal Welfare Act's congressional statement
of policy asserts that Congress finds it necessary to regulate animals used in commerce
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also observed that disclosures by animal rights activists contribute to the
public debate and are protected under the First Amendment.'9 "In
determining what is a matter of legitimate public interest, account must be
taken of the customs and conventions of the community."200
The Ouderkirks' third and final privacy tort claim for false light also
failed because the information PETA disclosed was substantially true.2 01
The Ouderkirks argued that PETA should not have edited the recorded
footage to omit certain parts that may have been redemptive.202 In denying
the false light claim, however, the court asserted that substantially true
disclosures will not support liability for failing to include facts that might
have cast the plaintiff in a more favorable light.20 3
Ouderkirk stands for the general concept that claims for violation of
privacy rights, specifically those found in tort law, do not, and should not
discourage the dissemination of information about matters of legitimate
public interest.20 The plaintiffs' intrusion claim failed because a business
that engages with the public interest has no right to privacy in regard to its
activities.20 5  Their misappropriation claim failed because the First
Amendment protects information the public has a right to know. 206 The false
light claim failed because the disclosed information was of legitimate public
concern and was substantially true.207 Although the plaintiffs did not bring
a privacy claim asserting publicity given to private facts, that claim would
have failed for the same reason as the others-the information disclosed
simply was not private. Other cases stand for the same idea.208
"to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes
or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment," and "to assure the humane
treatment of animals during transportation in commerce." 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2012). The
act also has provisions "intended to provide representation for general community
interests in the proper care and treatment of animals." 7 U.S.C. § 2143(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2012).
199. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *19.
200. Id. at *20 (citing Winstead v. Sweeney, 517 N.W.2d 874, 877 (1994)). This
standard is similar to that advocated by the Warren and Brandeis article and more modem
case law to determine whether a protectable privacy interest exists. See supra notes 172--
73 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
201. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *20-22.
202. Id. at *22.
203. Id.
204. See generally id.
205. Id. at *13.
206. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *20.
207. Id. at *22.
208. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269,
1284 (Nev. 1995).
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Notably, the Ouderkirks, just as the plaintiffs in Otter and Herbert, ran
a business that involved processing animals on their private property.209 The
Ouderkirks had no protectable privacy interest in their small business, a
chinchilla ranch consisting of about 700 animals.2 0 The difference between
the Ouderkirks and ag-gag statute beneficiaries is simply that a multi-billion-
dollar corporation that produces most of America's food via monopolistic,
unsanitary, and often unethical means undoubtedly has a reduced privacy
right relative to natural persons like the Ouderkirks.2 1' If a natural person's
privacy interest is outweighed by the First Amendment in the context of a
small business that engages in animal abuse, then the privacy interest of a
large, corporate factory farm will undoubtedly yield to the First Amendment.
B. Substantive Due Process: The Right to Decisional Privacy
Considering the fundamental value of human dignity, the variety of
ways the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted to provide personal privacy
rights should come as no surprise. Although the Constitution does not
expressly provide for a right to "privacy,"2 12 Griswold v. Connecticut
interprets the penumbras of the Bill of Rights to provide privacy protection,
which is further protected from infringement by the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 13
Griswold established that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."214 These penumbral privacy rights are formed by
the First Amendment freedoms of speech and association; the Third
Amendment right to be free from quartering soldiers in times of peace; the
Fourth Amendment right o be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
of persons, houses, papers, and effects; the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination; and the Ninth Amendment, under which the specific
rights granted by the Constitution "shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."215 Just as the right of association
is an implicit right that must be honored to make First Amendment rights
meaningful, Griswold held that decisional privacy is an implicit right that
must be honored to make the Bill of Rights meaningful.216
209. Ouderkirk, 2007 WL 1035093, at *1.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville, 755 N.E.2d 589, 593-94 (Ind. 2001);
N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 730-31 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
212. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
213. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 483.
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This privacy doctrine emanating from Griswold and its progeny has
been categorized as being within the scope of substantive due process.217
Most directly, it protects what some refer to as decisional privacy, or
personal autonomy, but ultimately, like common law tort privacy, it protects
human dignity.218 Other landmark cases that flesh out the abstract scope of
substantive due process include Griswold v. Connecticut,219 Loving v.
Virginia,2 20 Roe v. Wade,22 1 Zablocki v. Redhail,222 Planned Parenthood of
Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey,223 Lawrence v. Texas,224 and most recently,
Obergefell v. Hodges.2 25  These cases lend constitutional protection that
"deffies] categorical description" to "matters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
217. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 129 ("Appellant would discover this right in the concept of
personal 'liberty' embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in
personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill of Rights
or its penumbras . . . .").
218. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) ("In addition these
liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.").
219. 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (stating in the context of laws criminalizing the use of
birth control that "we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
220. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating of anti-miscegenation laws that "these statutes also
deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
221. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action,
as we feel it is, or . .. in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.").
222. 434 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1978) (stating, with respect to a law that prevented
marriage of one who had not paid child support, that "[m]ore recent decisions have
established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause" and that "[t]his Court has long
recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
223. 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (stating in the context of a challenge to an anti-abortion
statute that "[t]he most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights" and that "the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights against the States").
224. 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) ("We conclude the case should be resolved by
determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment....").
225. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-98 (2015).
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education,"226 matters that Warren and Brandeis would have referred to as
"domestic," and matters that, once again, make sense only in the context of
individual human beings, not corporations.
The law treats corporations as "persons" deserving of constitutional
rights in certain contexts and refrains from doing so in others.227  For
example, corporations have been said to qualify as "persons" within the
meaning of the First Amendment.22 8 In fact, just recently the Supreme Court
clarified that a corporation is a "person" within the context of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. 229  The Supreme Court has also held, in the
exceedingly controversial Citizens United ecision, that corporations have a
First Amendment right to engage in political speech by spending money to
support candidates for public office.23o However, certain "purely personal"
constitutional guarantees do not extend to corporations to the degree they
extend to natural persons, such as the privilege against self-incrimination and
any substantial right to privacy.231
Common law sources offer somewhat conflicting information as to
whether corporations are "persons" in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment.232 The Supreme Court has asserted that "corporations can
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy. "233
But, the Supreme Court has also asserted that "[c]orporations are persons
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States."234 However, these cases asserting that corporations are
"persons" under the Fourteenth Amendment are doing so in contexts that
have nothing to do with privacy.2 35 Furthermore, these cases are old, and
226. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (noting that these cases demonstrate that
"there are limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct").
227. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014) ("The term
'person' sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and
it sometimes is limited to natural persons.").
228. See id. at 2768.
229. Id.
230. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
231. Beckwith Electric Co., Inc. v. Sebelius, 960 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1338 (M.D. Fla.
2013), appeal dismissed (1 Ith Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).
232. Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923)
(stating that a corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment).
233. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974); accord Sebelius, 960
F. Supp. 2d at 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2013).
234. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886); accord First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 771 (1978); Covington & L. Tpk. Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896).
235. See, e.g., Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765 (asserting that a corporation is a person entitled
to speech protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Sandford, 164 U.S.
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modem authority has established the better rule. Modem authority suggests
that whether or not a particular guarantee is "purely personal" or is
unavailable to corporations for other reasons "depends on the nature, history,
and purpose of the [particular constitutional] guarantee. "236 "Privacy rights
accorded artificial entities are not stagnant, but depend on the
circumstances."2 37
The language used in cases questioning what sorts of privacy rights
artificial entities have demonstrates that courts are hesitant, if not unable, to
rule conclusively on the matter.238  A case may, for example, cite the
proposition that artificial entities are entitled to some degree of privacy right
but also assert that state and federal constitutional provisions protecting
privacy "simply do[ ] not apply to corporations."239 The language is
contradictory. Still, one thing from these cases is clear: the public attributes
of artificial entities reduce the reasonable expectation of privacy to which an
entity is entitled, and courts want flexibility in dealing with the issue.240
A recent Supreme Court ruling offers guidance as to whether
corporations are "persons" in the context of privacy rights: corporations are
not traditionally considered "persons," either generally according to the plain
meaning of the word, or specifically in the context of privacy rights.24 in
2011, the Supreme Court agreed in FCC v. AT&T that "[w]hen it comes to
the word 'personal,' there is little support for the notion that it denotes
at 592 ("It is now settled that corporations are persons, within the meaning of the
constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of
law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws."); Cnty. of Santa Clara, 118
U.S. at 394 (asserting that a corporation is a person entitled to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
236. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
285 (1989).
237. Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 384
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
238. See, e.g., Hecht v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 446, 457 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
("Like the Supreme Court ... we need not decide in this case any broad issues of the
scope of privacy rights-to which an artificial entity or partnership is entitled, as compared
to those of the individual partners.") (citations omitted).
239. Id. at 456-57 (holding that an LLP had no protectable privacy right in the financial
information of a law firm requested for discovery).
240. See id. at 456; see also Ameri-Medical Corp., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 384 (stating that
privacy rights of artificial entities depend on the circumstances).
241. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 284 (stating that a corporation is "an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law" and that
corporations are not entitled to "purely personal guarantees whose historic function ...
has been limited to the protection of individuals") (punctuation omitted).
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corporations, even in the legal context."24 2 In its ruling, the Court asserted
that AT&T could not point to a single instance in which any court or statute
has referred to a corporation's personal privacy.243  Instead, numerous
treatises indicate that personal privacy does not apply to corporations.2 44
Interestingly, the Court seemed comfortable using the terms "artificial
entities" and "artificial persons" interchangeably with "corporations,"2 45
which has implications that extend to other types of business associations.
Although AT&T tried to gain traction from the idea that corporations are
entitled to some degree of Fourth Amendment protection, the Court
concluded that the case did not require it to rule on the scope of a
corporation's privacy rights as a matter of either constitutional or common
law, and that AT&T could give no sound reason for abandoning the ordinary
meaning of the term "personal privacy."246 Therefore, with respect to
personal privacy rights, corporations do not enjoy a default status as
"persons."24 7
Instead, a corporation enjoys the elevated status of personhood only in
certain privileged contexts.248 As alluded to previously, both criminal and
civil law recognize that corporations are special entities with special qualities
that distinguish them from individual persons.249 "They are endowed with
public attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which
they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal
Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced measure of
242. FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 405, 409-10 (2011) ("We reject the argument
that because 'person' is defined for purposes of FOIA to include a corporation, the phrase
'personal privacy' in Exemption 7(C) reaches corporations as well. The protection in
FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that it would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not extend to corporations.
We trust that AT&T will not take it personally.").
243. Id. at 406.
244. Id. at 406-07 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(I) (1976) ("A
corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right of
privacy."); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 97, at 641-42 (2d ed. 1955) ("A corporation or
a partnership as such can have no personal privacy, although it seems clear that it may
have an exclusive right to its name and its business prestige.") (footnotes omitted); cf
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 843-44 (3d ed. 1964) ("It seems to be generally
agreed that the right of privacy is one pertaining only to individuals, and that a
corporation or a partnership cannot claim it as such.") (footnotes omitted); W. PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 815 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted)).
245. See A T&T Inc., 562 U.S. at 397, 398, 403, 404, 407.
246. Id. at 407.
247. See id. at 406.
248. See id. at 404-05.
249. See supra note 149 for discussion of how criminal law treats business entities.
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regulation."250 Accordingly, the nature and purposes of the corporate entity,
and the interests it seeks to protect, both determine whether a corporation has
a protectable privacy interest.251
Two critical factors used by California courts include (1) the strength
of the nexus between the corporation's right to privacy and the human
individual's right to be left alone and (2) the context in which the controversy
arises.2 52 As originally suggested by Warren and Brandeis, privacy law still
reflects "an elasticity which shall take account of the varying circumstances
of each case."253 A defendant corporation, for example, has no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to information that allows the
government to ensure that corporate behavior complies with the public
interest and the law; a corporate taxpayer's right to privacy is outweighed by
the assessor's need for information in part because "the nexus between a
corporation's right to privacy and an individual's right to be left alone is all
but nonexistent."254
Other contextual factors that seem potentially important include the
size and strength of the artificial entity and whether it is publicly or privately
held, the way in which it is regulated, and whether it operates as a
monopoly.255 These factors are important because of their implications
regarding the public's right to know.
The larger and more powerful the artificial entity, the greater the impact
it potentially has on the public generally,256 and the more attenuated the
250. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); see California
Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-66 (1974); see also Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) ("Gulf is a corporation which exists at the
pleasure of the state. Part of its social contract includes the requirement that it help
support the society which permits its very existence.").
251. Roberts, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
252. Id. at 410-11 (holding that "[w]ithout denigrating the fact that a corporation does
enjoy a right to privacy in some circumstances, the assertion that such a right should exist
in the circumstances of the instant case is unreasonable").
253. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 153, at 215.
254. Roberts, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 411-12 (stating, in denying a corporation a privacy right
in the context of tax information, that "law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to
satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public
interest"). Notably, California's Constitution expressly provides for a right to privacy,
but despite California's progressive stance on privacy rights, the court said, "[t]he
constitutional provision simply does not apply to corporations." Id. at 406.
255. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV.
548, 548-50 (1969).
256. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1210 (D. Idaho
2015), appealfiled (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015) (referring to the meat industry as "powerful"
three times in holding the Idaho ag-gag statute unconstitutional); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 (2014) (alluding to the fact that the size of the
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nexus between the individual person's and the entity's right to privacy. Also,
the Supreme Court's holding in Burwell that corporations are considered
persons in the context of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for
example, was applied narrowly to closely held, as opposed to publicly held,
corporations.25 7 Although Burwell did not involve privacy rights, similar
considerations would likely be applicable in the context of determining
whether a corporation had a protectable privacy interest.
The highly regulated nature of an industry also indicates that the public
likely has a right to know about a particular entity's business activities.258
Furthermore, when a highly regulated industry or entity operates in a way
that minimizes competition and dominates a particular market, as does the
meat industry,259 the public's right to know is perhaps at its strongest because
the public has little choice but to deal with the monopoly or quasi-
monopoly.2 60
C. States Unanimously Deny Privacy Rights to Corporations
The states seem to agree that corporations enjoy a lesser right to privacy
than do natural persons.2 6' Most states in the United States do not recognize
an express constitutional right to privacy, and none of the ones that do extend
corporation is relevant in saying that "[t]hese cases, however, do not involve publicly
traded corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS
refers will often assert RFRA claims").
257. See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769. Even though the Hobby Lobby chain has grown
into a nationwide chain, the privately held aspect of the company seemed to outweigh
the Court's consideration of its size in allowing it to claim personhood. See id. at 2765.
258. See Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1207-08 (referring to the meat industry as "heavily
regulated" three times in holding the Idaho ag-gag statute unconstitutional); see also
Larry M. Elison & Deborah E. Elison, Comments on Government Censorship and
Secrecy, 55 MONT. L. REv. 175, 199 (1994) ("Too often, commissions formed to regulate
industries become subservient to the industry they regulate and the so-called public
representative in the form of a consumer counsel becomes subservient to both the
commission and the industry. The necessity for public observation of regulated industries
and regulating agencies i  obvious and should not be restricted.").
259. See Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America,
supra note 65, at 1-2.
260. See Elison & Elison, supra note 258, at 198-99 (stating that "[c]orporate
individual privacy is an oxymoron" and that "[p]ublicly regulated industries .. .are not
typical corporations[;] [t]hey are state regulated monopolistic enterprises that are given
special support and are expressly controlled by government").
261. See Tiffany M. Wagner, Privacy-the Montana Supreme Court Overturns
Twenty-Five Years of Precedent Holding That the Individual Right-to-Privacy No
Longer Extends to Corporations Under the Montana State Constitution, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1533, 1545 (2005).
2016] 51
JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY
it to corporations.26 2 Ten states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington)
recognize a constitutional right to privacy, and Montana is the only state that
ever extended such a privacy right to artificial entities.263 In 2003, however,
the Montana Supreme Court overturned precedent and held that Montana's
constitutional right to privacy extends only to natural human beings.2 6
Furthermore, states that recognize an implicit constitutional right to privacy
have rejected the idea that corporations should enjoy such protection.265
V. CONCLUSION
The historical and modem development of privacy law demonstrates
that privacy rights have always been intended, ultimately, to protect the
feelings of natural persons, whether it be common law tort privacy,
constitutional privacy, informational privacy, or decisional privacy.
Although courts seem unable to offer clear guidance as to the exact degree
of privacy rights to which an artificial business entity is entitled, the law
makes clear that artificial entities are not entitled to the same degree of
privacy rights as natural individuals. The law seems willing to extend a
nominal privacy interest to artificial entities at best.
This weak privacy interest is the only interest asserted in defense of ag-
gag bills that are showing up across the country. When weighed alongside
the public's right to know about the food safety issues, animal abuse, anti-
competitive and poorly regulated behavior, and environmentally toxic and
unsustainable production methods inherent in factory farming, an artificial
entity's right to privacy, even one that is legislatively created, will be
outweighed by First Amendment considerations every time. Thus,
practically speaking, it would seem as if businesses engaged in producing
America's food supply have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their
business activities if the public's right to know is implicated. As Otter held,
food production simply is not a private matter. Regardless of what form
privacy rights take, their extension to artificial entities is not favored under
the law.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1536, 1545-46; accord Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 3, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-
protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx.
264. Great Falls Tribune v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 82 P.3d 876, 883 (Mont.
2003).
265. Id.
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